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Abstract
This paper deals with cooperation situations in linear production problems
in which a set of goods are to be produced from a set of resources so that
a certain benefit function is maximized, assuming that resources not used
in the production plan have no value by themselves. The Owen set is a
well-know solution rule for the class of linear production processes. Despite
their stability properties, Owen allocations might give null payoff to players
that are necessary for optimal production plans. This paper shows that,
in general, the aforementioned drawback cannot be avoided allowing only
allocations within the core of the cooperative game associated to the original
linear production process. In this paper a new solution set named EOwen is
introduced. For any player whose resources are needed in at least one optimal
production plan, the EOwen set contains at least one allocation that assigns
a strictly positive payoff to such player.
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1. Introduction
A benefit cooperative game is a pair (N, v), where N = {1, 2, ..., n} is
the set of players and v : 2N → R is the characteristic function assigning to
every coalition S ⊂ N the maximum benefit that the cooperation between
players in S would yield. For a complete introduction on cooperative game
theory see for instance Owen (1995) or Forgo´ et al. (1999). Assuming that
the game is superadditive, that is v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ), ∀ S, T ⊂ N ,
cooperation among all players is beneficial and, therefore, the grand coalition
N is to form.
One of the main questions in cooperative game theory is how to dis-
tribute the benefit obtained by the grand coalition N among the players.
An allocation is a vector α ∈ Rn, such that αi is the payoff of player i and∑n
i=1 αi = v(N). One well-accepted way of allocating v(N) among the play-
ers is to find allocations in the core. The core of a game (N, v), denoted by
Core(N, v), is the set of allocations satisfying that no coalition of players can
obtain a better payoff by acting separately from the rest of players. That is,
Core(N, v) = {α ∈ Rn : v(S) ≤ α(S) ∀ S ⊂ N, v(N) = α(N)}, (1)
where α(S) =
∑
i∈S αi, ∀ S ⊂ N . In principle, the core has at least two
problems: the core of a game might be empty, that is, there are games for
which no core allocations exist, and finding a core allocation might be a NP-
hard problem. Along the years, many other allocation rules have appeared
in the literature. One of the most used allocation rules is the Shapley value,
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which has attracted a lot of interest for its many applications, see Moretti
and Patrone (2008).
A linear production problem is a situation in which certain goods that
can be sold in a market are to be produced from a set of available distinct
resources. An implicit feature of the linear production problems we deal
with in this paper is that the resources not used in the production plan
have no value at all. Situations like this may arise when the resources are
perishable and, if not used in the next production plan, they are wasted.
Another example of this situation is found in some industries in developed
countries that give their excesses to underdeveloped countries, to charity
organizations, or even to other companies within the same area as long as
they are not competing ones. This is beneficial for both parties: the donor
party gets rid of excesses which, if not used, must be eliminated at certain
cost, and the receiving party only has to pay for the shipping costs, which is
usually cheaper than having to buy the material.
In this paper we study a new set of allocations for linear production
processes (LP processes for short), which arise when a bunch of players N =
{1, . . . , n} with conflicting objectives control the resources of a LP problem.
A cooperative game, called LP game, can be associated to each LP process.
(Note that different LP processes may generate the same LP game.) An early
reference to LP games can be found in Owen (1975). LP games are totally
balanced games, so every subgame of a LP game has a non-empty core. By
solving the dual problem of the underlying linear production problem we
can obtain a set of allocations for LP processes known as Owen allocations
(see Owen (1975)), which has been well-studied in the literature. One of its
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main properties is that Owen allocations are always core allocations, and
are easily computed. More recently, Van Gellekom et al. (2000) provided an
axiomatic characterization of this solution set. In this paper we show that,
despite their stability properties, Owen allocations do not always yield a fair
distribution of the benefit obtained. For instance, a player whose resources
are necessary for any optimal plan may receive a null payoff from Owen
allocations. Such drawback is discussed in this paper, and an alternative
allocation set is proposed.
Since the pioneering work by Owen, several generalizations of LP games
have appeared in the literature. Dubey and Shapley (1984) study a game in
which players have partial control over the constraints of a general mathemat-
ical programming problem. Granot (1986) introduces another generalization
in which the resources owned by a coalition are not restricted to be the sum
of the resources of players in the coalition. Curiel et al. (1989) introduce
LP games with committee control, obtaining results on the balancedness
of these games, whose core has been more recently studied by Molina and
Tejada (2004).
The goal of this paper is to introduce a new set of allocations for linear
production processes that avoid some of the aforementioned drawbacks of the
Owen set. To this end, the rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section
2 gives a short introduction to LP processes and a motivation of the studied
problem. Some definitions and technical results are given in Section 3. The
allocation set proposed in this paper is introduced and analyzed in Section 4.
An axiomatic characterization and some of its properties are given, as well
as a discussion about the impossibility of finding core allocations that avoid
4
the unfairness problem of the Owen allocations we address in this paper.
2. Linear Production processes
A LP problem is a situation in which there is a finite set of resources
R = {1, 2, . . . , r} and from those resources a set P = {1, 2, . . . , p} of con-
sumption goods can be produced. The production technologies are given by
a matrix A ∈ Rr×p, where Aij ≥ 0 denotes the amount of resource i nec-
essary to produce one unit of product j, ∀ i = 1, . . . , r, j = 1, . . . , p. It is
also assumed that the demand of every product is large enough to sell all
produced products, the unitary market price of product j being cj ≥ 0. The
objective of a LP problem is to decide how much of each product should be
produced so that the general benefit is maximized.
Assume now that a group of players N = {1, . . . , n} control the resources
R = {1, 2, . . . , r}, that is, player k owns Bik ≥ 0 units of resource i, k =
1, . . . , n, i = 1, . . . , r. Therefore, let B = (Bik)r×n be the resource-player
matrix. Let b ∈ Rr be the resource vector, that is b = BeN , where eS ∈ R
n
satisfying (eS)k = 1 if k ∈ S, and zero otherwise for all S ⊆ N . In other
words, bi is the total amount of resource i owned by the grand coalition, that
is, bi =
∑n
k=1Bik ∀ i ∈ R. Thus, the maximum profit that can be made by
the cooperation of all players is the value of problem PN :
max cx
s.t. Ax ≤ b
x ≥ 0
(PN),
min yb
s.t. yA ≥ c
y ≥ 0
(DN), (2)
where DN is the dual problem of PN (see Bazaraa et al. (1990) for a de-
scription of duality theory in linear programming). It is easy to check that,
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although players can try to produce separately, it is always more profitable
to join their resources since the benefit they obtain this way is at least as
high as the sum of the possible coalitions’ profits separately. For a coalition
S ⊂ N , we define its characteristic function, v(S), via the optimal value of
problem PS:
max cx
s.t. Ax ≤ BeS
x ≥ 0
(PS),
min yBeS
s.t. yA ≥ c
y ≥ 0
(DS), (3)
where DS is the dual of PS.
Problem PS is feasible and bounded for all possible coalitions if BeS > 0,
c ≥ 0 and ∀ j : cj > 0 there is at least one resource i ∈ R with Aij > 0.
Each triple (A,B, c) satisfying the conditions above will be called in the
following, according to Van Gellekom et al. (2000), a linear production pro-
cess. Let L denote the class of LP processes. From the definition of the
characteristic function v one can associate to each LP process a cooperative
game (N, v). The reader may note that the same LP game can originate
from different LP processes.
Now a natural question arises: how to divide the profit made by the
grand coalition among the players. Let us introduce some notation that will
be useful in the rest of the paper.
Let (A,B, c) ∈ L. The feasible regions of problems PN and DN , see (2),
are denoted by
Fmax(A,B, c) := {x ∈ R
p
+ : Ax ≤ b},
Fmin(A,B, c) := {y ∈ R
n
+ : yA ≥ c},
(4)
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respectively. The optimal values of problems PN and DN are denoted by
vmax(A,B, c) := max{cx : x ∈ Fmax(A,B, c)},
vmin(A,B, c) := min{yb : y ∈ Fmin(A,B, c)},
(5)
respectively, and the set of optimal solutions to PN and DN by
Omax(A,B, c) := {x ∈ Fmax(A,B, c) : cx = vmax(A,B, c)},
Omin(A,B, c) := {y ∈ Fmin(A,B, c) : yb = vmin(A,B, c)}.
(6)
A solution rule ϕ on L is a map assigning to every LP process (A,B, c) ∈
L a set Γ ⊂ Rn such that
∑
i∈N γi = vmax(A,B, c) for all γ ∈ Γ. Each member
of this set is an allocation. A well-known solution rule for cooperative games
is the core, see (1). One well-accepted solution rule specific for LP processes
is the Owen set, defined from optimal solutions to the dual problem DN .
Definition 1. Let (A,B, c) ∈ L. The Owen set of (A,B, c) is
Owen(A,B, c) := {yB : y ∈ Omin(A,B, c)}. (7)
Owen (1975) proved thatOwen(A,B, c) ⊆ Core(A,B, c) for every (A,B, c) ∈
L. That is, Owen allocations are stable in the sense that no group of players
can obtain a better payoff by acting separately. Despite these good prop-
erties, they should not be considered as ideal allocations. See the following
example.
Example 1. Consider the 3-player game (A,B, c) ∈ L where
A =


1 0
1 1
0 1
1 2


, B =


1 0 1
0 4 0
1 0 0
0 5 0


, c =

 1
2

 .
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The corresponding dual problem D(N) is
min 2y1 + 4y2 +y3 +5y4
s.t. y1 + y2 +y4 ≥ 1
y2 +y3 +2y4 ≥ 2
y1, y2, y3, y4 ≥ 0.
(8)
The characteristic function of the associated game is v({i}) = v({1, 3}) =
0 ∀ i = 1, 2, 3, v({1, 2}) = 3, v({2, 3}) = 1, v({1, 2, 3}) = 4. It can be
checked that Omin(A,B, c) = {(1, 0, 2, 0)} and, therefore, Owen(A,B, c) =
{(1, 0, 2, 0)B} = {(3, 0, 1)}.
This allocation is in the core of the game but, is it a “fair” allocation?
Note that player 2 receives nothing but, without his resources, the optimal
production plan cannot be achieved. So, the Owen allocation gives a null
payoff to a player whose resources are necessary for the optimal production
plan.
What happened in Example 1 is a general drawback of the Owen set in LP
processes. This is a consequence of the complementary slackness theorem,
see Bazaraa et al. (1990), which says that if there is some surplus of resource
i in an optimal solution x∗ ∈ Omax(A,B, c) (meaning (Ax
∗)i < bi), then
y∗i = 0 ∀ y
∗ ∈ Omin(A,B, c). This condition for optimality conveys a simple
economic principle: if there is a positive slack in a constrained primal re-
source, i.e. there are leftovers, then the additional quantities of that resource
must have no value (shadow prices are zero). This means that only players
owning resources that generate no surplus have the chance of receiving a
strictly positive payoff from Owen allocations, which are based on shadow
prices. This fact could make players get rid of their surpluses so that the
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corresponding dual variables are not forced to be null, so they have the pos-
sibility of receiving a positive reward from allocations obtained from dual
solutions.
The following section presents a new solution rule on LP processes that
avoids the drawback previously discussed. It is based on the idea that the
surpluses of resources should not be taken into account. Therefore players
owning leftovers of resources in an optimal production plan are allowed to
get rid of them at no cost, nor benefit, and play a new reduced game. A
similar approach was used to allocate the benefits obtained in a distribution
model, see Perea et al. (2009). Another example of an allocation trying to
avoid unfairness can be found in C¸iftc¸i and Tijs (2009), who give some rules
for minimum spanning tree games.
3. Technical results and definitions
In this section we introduce some technical results and definitions that
will be useful for presenting our new solution rule. First, the concept of
intermediate matrix will be needed in the rest of the paper. Let M , M1, M2
be three matrices in Rr×n. We say that
M ∈ [M1,M2] if and only if M1ik ≤ Mik ≤M
2
ik∀ i = 1, ..., r, k = 1, ..., n. (9)
Let (A,B, c) ∈ L and x∗ ∈ Omax(A,B, c) one solution to the correspond-
ing problem PN . The coordinates of x
∗ define the amount of consumption
goods to be produced. Now consider the LP process in which each player k
reduces the amount of its resource i so that the total amount of this resource
owned by all agents is (Ax∗)i :=
∑p
j=1Aijx
∗
j , ∀ i = 1, ..., r.
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Therefore, for any optimal solution x∗, let Bx
∗
ik be the updated amount of
resource i owned by agent k, satisfying that 0 ≤ Bx
∗
ik ≤ Bik and
∑n
k=1B
x∗
ik =
(Ax∗)i, that is, player k gets rid of Bik − B
x∗
ik ≥ 0 units of resource i, ∀ i =
1, ..., r, k = 1, ..., n. Since there might be (infinitely) many ways of finding
matrices satisfying these constraints, we make use of the set constituted by
of all of them.
Given a LP process (A,B, c) and x∗ ∈ Omax(A,B, c), the set of all possible
reduced resource-player matrices of (A,B, c) associated to x∗ is
B(A,B, x∗) = {Bx
∗
∈ [Θ, B] :
n∑
k=1
Bx
∗
ik = (Ax
∗)i, ∀ i ∈ R}, (10)
where Θ denotes the matrix with the appropriate dimensions and all entries
equal to zero.
Define the vector bx
∗
∈ Rr, where bx
∗
i = (Ax
∗)i, ∀ i ∈ R. Note that
bx
∗
i =
∑n
k=1B
x∗
ik for all B
x∗ ∈ B(A,B, x∗). So, for every x∗ ∈ Omax(A,B, c)
and Bx
∗
∈ B(A,B, x∗) a new LP process (A,Bx
∗
, c) ∈ L is defined. Its
corresponding problems PS(B
x∗) and DS(B
x∗) are:
max cx
s.t. Ax ≤ Bx
∗
eS
x ≥ 0
PS(B
x∗),
min yBx
∗
eS
s.t. yA ≥ c
y ≥ 0.
DS(B
x∗).
(11)
Remark 1. Note that PN(B
x∗) and DN(B
x∗) only depend on x∗, and not on
the chosen reduced matrix. Therefore, once x∗ ∈ Omax(A,B, c) is fixed, both
Omax(A,B
x∗ , c) and Omin(A,B
x∗, c) are constant for any Bx
∗
∈ B(A,B, x∗).
The above property leads us to the definition of reduced LP process.
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Definition 2. (A,Bx
∗
, c) is a reduced LP process of (A,B, c) associated to
Bx
∗
, for every x∗ ∈ Omax(A,B, c) and every B
x∗ ∈ B(A,B, x∗).
The next lemma gives some properties on the value of problems PN and
DN and their solution sets, needed for the rest of the paper.
Lemma 1. Let (A,B, c) ∈ L. Then
1. vmax(A,B, c) = vmax(A,B
x∗, c) ∀ x∗ ∈ Omax(A,B, c), ∀ B
x∗ ∈ B(A,B, x∗).
2. vmin(A,B, c) = vmin(A,B
x∗ , c) ∀ x∗ ∈ Omax(A,B, c), ∀ B
x∗ ∈ B(A,B, x∗).
3.
Omax(A,B, c) =
⋃
x∗∈Omax(A,B,c)
⋃
Bx
∗
∈B(A,B,x∗)
Omax(A,B
x∗ , c)
=
⋃
x∗∈Omax(A,B,c)
⋂
Bx
∗
∈B(A,B,x∗)
Omax(A,B
x∗ , c).
4.
Omin(A,B, c) ⊆
⋂
x∗∈Omax(A,B,c)
⋃
Bx
∗
∈B(A,B,x∗)
Omin(A,B
x∗ , c)
=
⋂
x∗∈Omax(A,B,c)
⋂
Bx
∗
∈B(A,B,x∗)
Omin(A,B
x∗, c).
Proof.
1. It follows because x∗ is a solution to PN(B
x∗) ∀ x∗ ∈ Omax(A,B, c), ∀B
x∗ ∈
B(A,B, x∗).
2. The result follows from part 1 of Lemma 1 and the strong duality
theorem in linear programming (vmax = vmin).
3. First consider x̂ ∈ Omax(A,B, c) and B
x̂ ∈ B(A,B, x̂). Trivially x̂ ∈
Omax(A,B
x̂, c). Then
x̂ ∈
⋃
x∗∈Omax(A,B,c)
⋃
Bx
∗
∈B(A,B,x̂)
Omax(A,B
x∗ , c). (12)
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Now consider x̂ ∈
⋃
x∗∈Omax(A,B,c)
⋃
Bx
∗
∈B(A,B,x̂)
Omax(A,B
x∗, c). Then, there
exists x∗ ∈ Omax(A,B, c) andB
x∗ ∈ B(A,B, x∗) such that x̂ ∈ Omax(A,B
x∗ , c).
Thus
Ax̂ ≤ bx
∗
= Ax∗ ≤ b
x̂ ≥ 0
cx̂ = vmax(A,B
x∗ , c) = vmax(A,B, c)


⇒ x̂ ∈ Omax(A,B, c). (13)
Since Omax(A,B
1, c) = Omax(A,B
2, c) for all B1, B2 ∈ B(A,B, x̂) (see
Remark 1), the result is proven joining (12) and (13).
4. Let ŷ ∈ Omin(A,B, c) and x̂ ∈ Omax(A,B, c). Applying the comple-
mentary slackness theorem and the strong duality theorem in linear
programming, we have that ŷi = 0 for all i such that (Ax̂)i < bi, and if
(Ax̂)i = bi then bi = b
x̂
i . Therefore
ŷb =
n∑
i=1
ŷibi =
∑
i:(Ax̂)i=bi
ŷibi =
∑
i:(Ax̂)i=bi
ŷib
x̂
i =
n∑
i=1
ŷib
x̂
i = ŷb
x̂.
Thus, for each Bx̂ ∈ B(A,B, x̂)
ŷbx̂ = ŷb = cx̂ = vmax(A,B, c) = vmax(A,B
x̂, c) = vmin(A,B
x̂, c). (14)
Trivially ŷ ∈ Fmin(A,B
x̂, c), since problems DN and DN(B
x̂) have the
same constraints. Thus, we conclude that ŷ ∈ Omin(A,B
x̂, c) and the
result follows from Remark 1.

Note that, if x∗ ∈ Omax(A,B, c) and B
x∗ ∈ B(A,B, x∗), then x∗ ∈
Omax(A,B
′, c) for all B′ ∈ [Bx
∗
, B]. The next lemma states that the set
of reduced matrices of such B′ is contained in that of B.
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Lemma 2. Let x∗ ∈ Omax(A,B, c), and let B
′ ∈ [Bx
∗
, B] for some Bx
∗
∈
B(A,B, x∗). Then B(A,B′, x∗) ⊆ B(A,B, x∗).
Proof. Under the hypotheses in the statement, let B˜ ∈ B(A,B′, x∗). Since
B˜ ∈ [Θ, B′] ⊆ [Θ, B], and using (10), it is easy to see that B˜ ∈ B(A,B, x∗). 
4. The Extended Owen Set
In this section a new solution rule for the class of LP processes is pre-
sented. It is based on the idea of not taking into account the surplus gener-
ated by optimal solutions to the primal linear programming problem defining
the value of v(N). Therefore, we first have to find out how much the amount
of resources can be reduced while the maximum profit is unchanged. The
following lemma gives a hint to answer this question and states that, in linear
production processes with only one optimal production plan, the minimum
amount of resources needed to generate the maximum profit must be bounded
from above by bx
∗
, where {x∗} = Omax(A,B, c).
Lemma 3. Let (A,B, c) ∈ L such that {x∗} = Omax(A,B, c). Let b
x∗ =
Ax∗. Let b′ ∈ Rn be such that b′ ≤ bx
∗
. Then, the maximum values of
problems P and P ′ coincide if and only if b′ = bx
∗
, where P and P ′ are
defined by
max cx
s.t. Ax ≤ b
x ≥ 0
(P ),
max cx
s.t. Ax ≤ b′
x ≥ 0
(P ′).
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Proof. Let (A,B, c) and b′ be a LP process and a vector satisfying the
conditions of the theorem, respectively. By contradiction, assume that there
exists x′ ≥ 0 : Ax′ ≤ b′, cx′ = cx∗ with b′ < b. One has that x′ 6= x∗, since
there exists j such that Aj•x
′ ≤ b′j < b
x∗
j = Aj•x
∗. Since b′ ≤ b, one has that
x′ is an optimal feasible solution to problem (P ). Since we had assumed that
there was only one solution to problem (P ), and cx′ = cx∗, the contradiction
appears and the result is proven. 
Note that, in the more general case with multiple optimal production plans,
we have that the vector b′ of the previous lemma is dominated by all the re-
source vectors associated to optimal production plans, that is, b′ ≥ bx
∗
∀ x∗ ∈
Omax(A,B, c). This can be easily proven adapting the result of Proposition
4.1 in Perea et al. (2009).
Based on this idea, the definition of the EOwen set follows.
Definition 3. Let (A,B, c) ∈ L. The Extended Owen set of (A,B, c) is the
set
EOwen(A,B, c) =
⋃
x∗∈Omax(A,B,c)
⋃
Bx
∗
∈B(A,B,x∗)
Owen(A,Bx
∗
, c). (15)
Remark 2. The reader may note that, although Omin(A,B
x∗ , c) is indepen-
dent of the choice of matrix Bx
∗
, once x∗ has been chosen (see Remark 1);
Owen(A,Bx
∗
, c) does not necessarily have a similar property.
In order to start gaining insights into this new solution rule, we present
the following result, which states that the more matrix B is reduced without
lowering Bx
∗
, the larger the Owen set of the corresponding LP process.
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Proposition 1. Let B̂ ∈ [Bx
∗
, B] for some reduced matrix Bx
∗
associated to
an optimal production plan x∗. Then we have that:
Owen(A,B, c) ⊆ Owen(A, B̂, c) ⊆ Owen(A,Bx
∗
, c).
Proof. Let α ∈ Owen(A,B, c) ⇒ ∃ y ∈ Omin(A,B, c) : α = yB. Let us
see that y ∈ Omin(A, B̂, c).
min yb
s.t. yA ≥ c
y ≥ 0
(D),
min yb̂
s.t. yA ≥ c
y ≥ 0
(D̂).
Since y ∈ Omin(A,B, c), by definition one has that y is optimal for problem
D. Therefore, y is feasible for problem D̂. Besides, as we proved in Lemma 1,
part 4, yb = yb̂. Thus y ∈ Omin(A, B̂, c). Applying again the complementary
slackness theorem, one has that:
αk =
n∑
i=1
yiBik =
∑
i:yi 6=0
yiBik =
∑
i:yi 6=0
yiB̂ik ⇒ α = yB̂.
Therefore we have proven that α ∈ Owen(A, B̂, c), and as a consequence
Owen(A,B, c) ⊆ Owen(A, B̂, c). Owen(A, B̂, c) ⊆ Owen(A,Bx
∗
, c) can be
proven analogously. 
An immediate corollary to the previous result states that the name Extended
Owen set is meaningful, as EOwen contains the Owen set.
Corollary 1. Owen(A,B, c) ⊆ EOwen(A,B, c) for all (A,B, c) ∈ L.
The following example proves that the inclusions in Proposition 1 and Corol-
lary 1 may be strict.
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Example 2. Take the LP process from Example 1. One can see that Omax(A,B, c) =
{x∗ = (2, 1)}. Therefore, Bx
∗
(in this case unique) and a choice of B̂ are:
Bx
∗
=


1 0 1
0 3 0
1 0 0
0 4 0


, B̂ =


1 0 1
0 3 0
1 0 0
0 5 0


.
Then, we obtain that problem DN (B
x∗) and that corresponding to B̂, DN(B̂),
are, respectively:
min 2y1 + 3y2 +y3 +4y4
s.t. y1 + y2 +y4 ≥ 1
y2 +y3 +2y4 ≥ 2
y1, y2, y3, y4 ≥ 0
DN(B
x∗),
min 2y1 + 3y2 +y3 +5y4
s.t. y1 + y2 +y4 ≥ 1
y2 +y3 +2y4 ≥ 2
y1, y2, y3, y4 ≥ 0
DN(B̂).
(16)
From the solutions to these problems, which are the convex hulls of {(1, 0, 2, 0),
(0, 1, 1, 0), (0, 0, 0, 1)} and {(1, 0, 2, 0), (0, 1, 1, 0)}, respectively, one can see
that Owen(A,Bx
∗
, c) (which in this example coincides with EOwen(A,B, c))
is the convex hull of {(3, 0, 1), (1, 3, 0), (0, 4, 0)} and Owen(A, B̂, c) is the
convex hull of {(3, 0, 1), (1, 3, 0)}. This way we prove that the relations de-
scribed in Proposition 1 are strict. Besides, note that there are allocations in
EOwen(A,B, c) that give player 2 a strictly positive payoff, unlike Owen(A,B, c).
Note as well that EOwen(A,B, c) ⊂ Core(A,B, c).
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From their definitions, it is easy to prove that for reduced LP processes,
as introduced in Definition 2, the EOwen set and the Owen set coincide.
Analogously, one can state that in LP processes where all the resources are
completely used, the EOwen set coincides with the Owen set.
The following proposition proves that allocations in the EOwen set dis-
tribute exactly v(N) among the players.
Proposition 2. Let (A,B, c) ∈ L and let γ ∈ EOwen(A,B, c). Then γ is
efficient.
Proof. Let γ ∈ EOwen(A,B, c). Then there exists x∗ ∈ Omax(A,B, c),
Bx
∗
∈ B(A,B, x∗) and ŷ ∈ Omin(A,B
x∗, c) such that γk =
∑r
i=1 ŷiB
x∗
ik ∀ k =
1, . . . , n. Therefore
γ(N) =
n∑
k=1
γk =
n∑
k=1
r∑
i=1
ŷiB
x∗
ik =
r∑
i=1
ŷi
n∑
k=1
Bx
∗
ik =
r∑
i=1
ŷib
x∗
i = ŷb
x∗ . (17)
Since ŷ ∈ Omin(A,B
x∗ , c) and x∗ ∈ Omax(A,B, c), we know that ŷb
x∗ = cx∗ =
v(N). This concludes that γ(N) = v(N). 
Another interesting property states that, for all players whose resources are
necessary to produce the maximum benefit v(N) in some optimal production
plan, there exists an allocation in EOwen that assigns them a strictly positive
payoff.
Theorem 1. Let (A,B, c) ∈ L and x∗ ∈ Omax(A,B, c), and let k ∈ N be a
player such that some of the resources that he owns are needed for the optimal
production plan x∗ to be developed. Then there exists α ∈ EOwen(A,B, c)
such that αk > 0.
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Proof. Let x∗ ∈ Omax(A,B, c), and B
x∗ ∈ B(A,B, x∗). By the strict
complementary slackness theorem, if the slack in the ith constraint of problem
PN(B
x∗) is zero, then there exists a solution y to DN(B
x∗) such that yi > 0
(see Theorem 10.7 in Vanderbei (1997)). Assuming that the units of the ith
resource owned by player k are needed for the optimal production plan x∗,
it is easy to see that Bx
∗
ik > 0. Then, the payoff of player k from the EOwen
allocation αBx∗ = yB
x∗ is, at least, yiB
x∗
ik > 0.

Note that this proposition allows us to state that the EOwen set always
overcomes the unfairness problem illustrated in Example 1.
Let us now introduce the property of upper limit inclusion (ULI), which
will be useful for our characterization of EOwen.
Property 1 (ULI). A solution rule ϕ satisfies ULI if for every (A,B, c) ∈
L, every x∗ ∈ Omax(A,B, c), and every matrix B
′ such that B′ ∈ [Bx
∗
, B] for
every Bx
∗
∈ B(A,B, x∗), we have that ϕ(A,B′, c) ⊆ ϕ(A,B, c).
The following result proves that EOwen satisfies this property.
Proposition 3. EOwen satisfies ULI.
Proof. Let (A,B, c) ∈ L. Consider x∗ ∈ Omax(A,B, c), and let B
′ ∈
[Bx
∗
, B] for every Bx
∗
reduced matrix associated to x∗. Similarly as we
proved in Proposition 1, it can be seen that Omax(A,B
′, c) ⊆ Omax(A,B, c).
Besides, since we proved in Lemma 2 that B(A,B, x∗) ⊇ B(A,B′, x∗), we
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have
EOwen(A,B, c) =
⋃
x∗∈Omax(A,B,c)
⋃
Bx
∗
∈B(A,B,x∗)Owen(A,B
x∗, c)
⊇
⋃
x∗∈Omax(A,B′,c)
⋃
Bx
∗
∈B(A,B,x∗)Owen(A,B
x∗, c)
⊇
⋃
x∗∈Omax(A,B′,c)
⋃
Bx
∗
∈B(A,B′,x∗)Owen(A,B
x∗, c)
= EOwen(A,B′, c).

Now we are ready to give a characterization of the EOwen solution rule
for linear production processes.
Theorem 2. Let ϕ be a solution rule over L. ϕ satisfies ULI, coincides with
the Owen set over LP processes without leftovers and is minimal if and only
if ϕ ≡ EOwen.
Proof.
• Clearly EOwen coincides with the Owen set in LP processes without
leftovers, and as proven in Proposition 3, EOwen satisfies ULI. Let
us see that EOwen is minimal. For this purpose, let ϕ be a solution
set that coincides with the Owen set in LP processes without leftovers
and satisfies ULI, and let (A,B, c) ∈ L. Therefore, Owen(A,Bx
∗
, c) =
ϕ(A,Bx
∗
, c) ⊆ ϕ(A,B, c) for all x∗ ∈ Omax(A,B, c) and all B
x∗ ∈
B(A,B, x∗). Hence
EOwen(A,B, c) =
⋃
x∗∈Omax(A,B,c)
⋃
Bx
∗
∈B(A,B,x∗)Owen(A,B
x∗, c)
=
⋃
x∗∈Omax(A,B,c)
⋃
Bx
∗
∈B(A,B,x∗) ϕ(A,B
x∗ , c)
⊆ ϕ(A,B, c)
which proves that EOwen is minimal.
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• Let ϕ be a solution rule over L satisfying the hypotheses of the theorem.
Therefore ϕ(A,Bx
∗
, c) = Owen(A,Bx
∗
, c) ∀ x∗ ∈ Omax(A,B, c) and for
every Bx
∗
∈ B(A,B, x∗), because (A,Bx
∗
, c) has no leftovers. Now,
since ϕ satisfies ULI we have that ϕ(A,Bx
∗
, c) ⊆ ϕ(A,B, c), therefore
EOwen(A,B, c) =
⋃
x∗∈Omax(A,B,c)
⋃
Bx
∗
∈B(A,B,x∗)
ϕ(A,Bx
∗
, c) ⊆ ϕ(A,B, c).
From the minimality of ϕ, and since EOwen satisfies the hypotheses of
the theorem, ϕ(A,B, c) ⊆ EOwen(A,B, c). Thus, EOwen(A,B, c) =
ϕ(A,B, c).

Let us now introduce the following increasing monotonicity (IM) property
that will lead us to another characterization of EOwen set:
Property 2 (IM). A solution rule ϕ satisfies IM if for every (A,B, c) ∈ L,
every x∗ ∈ Omax(A,B, c), and every B
1, B2 such that B1 ∈ [Bx
∗
, B] for each
Bx
∗
∈ B(A,B, x∗) and B2 ∈ [B1, B], we have that ϕ(A,B1, c) ⊆ ϕ(A,B2, c).
The following result states that increasing monotonicity is equivalent to up-
per limit inclusion.
Lemma 4. Let ϕ be a solution rule over L. Then ϕ satisfies ULI if and only
if ϕ satisfies IM.
Proof. Trivially, if ϕ satisfies IM then it satisfies ULI too. Conversely,
let (A,B, c) ∈ L, and x∗ ∈ Omax(A,B, c). Moreover, let B
1 ∈ [Bx
∗
, B]
for each Bx
∗
∈ B(A,B, x∗) and B2 ∈ [B1, B]. It is straightforward that
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x∗ ∈ Omax(A,B
2, c). Then, since B1 ∈ [Bx
∗
, B2] and ϕ satisfies IM, we have
that ϕ(A,B1, c) ⊆ ϕ(A,B2, c), which concludes the proof. 
From the equivalency between increasing monotonicity and upper limit in-
clusion, the following alternative characterization of EOwen trivially follows
from Theorem 2.
Corollary 2. Let ϕ be a solution rule over L. ϕ satisfies IM, coincides with
the Owen set over LP processes without leftovers and is minimal if and only
if ϕ ≡ EOwen.
We finish this section by studying the relation between EOwen, the Owen
set, and the core of the original game. It is obvious that Core(A,B, c) ⊆
Core(A,Bx
∗
, c) for every optimal production plan x∗ and every reduced ma-
trix Bx
∗
associated to it, since vB
x∗
(S) ≤ v(S) and vB
x∗
(N) = v(N), where
vB
x∗
denotes the characteristic function of the corresponding reduced game.
The following example shows that this relation may be strict.
Example 3. Consider the LP process (A,B, c) where
A =


1 0
1 1
0 1

 , B =


1 0
1 3
1 0

 , c =

 2
1

 .
It can be seen that Omax(A,B, c) = {x
∗ = (1, 1)}, and the characteristic
function of the associated game is v({1}) = 2, v({2}) = 0, v({1, 2}) = 3.
There is a surplus of resource 2. One reduced matrix (in which both players
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drop half of the units of resource 2 they had) is
Bx
∗
=


1 0
0.5 1.5
1 0

 ,
and vx
∗
({1}) = 1, vx
∗
({2}) = 0, v({1, 2}) = 3. Therefore, Core(A,B, c)  
Core(A,Bx
∗
, c).
Unfortunately, not all EOwen allocations are core allocations. However,
it is not always possible to find allocations that avoid the unfairness drawback
of the Owen set mentioned in this paper and remain in the core of the original
game at the same time. Therefore, one has to look for some compromise
between null-payoff to absolutely necessary players and un-stability. The
following example illustrates the above statements.
Example 4. Consider the LP process (A,B, c) with the following data,
A =


1 0
1 1
0 1

 , B =


1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1

 , c =

 1
1

 .
The characteristic function of the associated game is v({1, 2}) = v({2, 3}) =
v({1, 2, 3}) = 1, and zero for any other coalition. Therefore, the core of
this game consists of the singleton {(0, 1, 0)}. Note as well that without the
resources of players 1 and 3, player 2 gets nothing, but it is not possible to
give a positive payoff to players 1 and 3 with a core allocations.
Let us calculate the EOwen set for this example. One can see that the
extreme optimal production plans are x1 = (1, 0) and x2 = (0, 1), and that
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B(A,B, x1) and B(A,B, x2) consist only of one matrix each (named B1 and
B2, respectively). B1 has a diagonal equal to (1, 1, 0) and B2 has a diagonal
equal to (0, 1, 1). All non-diagonal entries are null for both matrices. It is
easy to see that Omin(A,B
1, c) is the union over t1 ≥ 1 and t2 ≥ 0 of the
convex hulls of {(1, 0, t1), (0, 1, t2)}, and that Omin(A,B
2, c) is the union over
t1 ≥ 1 and t2 ≥ 0 of the convex hulls of {(t1, 0, 1), (t2, 1, 0)}. Therefore,
Owen(A,B1, c) is the convex hull of {(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0)} and Owen(A,B2, c)
is the convex hull of {(0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 0)}. For every non-extreme optimal solu-
tion xa = (a, 1− a) (a ∈ (0, 1)), B(A,B, xa) consists only of one matrix Ba,
in which the diagonal is (a, 1, 1 − a), and the rest is zero. The correspond-
ing Omin(A,B
a, c) is the convex hull of {(0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1)}, and therefore the
Owen set of the corresponding reduced LP process is {(0, 1, 0), (a, 0, 1− a)}.
Therefore, EOwen(A,B, c) is the convex hull of {(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1)}
(all players can obtain a positive payoff from allocations in this set).
To summarize, the Owen set, the EOwen set and the core of the original
game have a relationship as shown in Figure 1.
&%
'$
Owen
EOwen
Core(A,B, c)
Figure 1: General relation between EOwen, Core and Owen .
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Conclusions
In this work we have introduced the EOwen set, a new solution rule on
the class of linear production processes which overcomes certain drawbacks of
the well-known Owen set, in the sense that one can always find an allocation
that gives a strictly positive payoff to players whose resources are needed for
(at least) one optimal production plan. Some examples in the paper show
that Owen allocations do not satisfy this property.
EOwen is defined as the union, over all possible optimal production plans
and all possible reduced matrices, of the Owen sets over the corresponding
reduced LP processes, in which players get rid of the leftovers in their re-
sources according to a reduced matrix. Several theoretical properties and an
axiomatic characterization of this new solution rule are given. By means of
an example we also prove that, in general, it is not possible to find allocations
that give non-null payoffs to players that are necessary in order to achieve
the optimal value of v(N) by restricting to the core.
We note that two types of players have been involved in this paper: group
T1, consisting of players such that some of the resources they own are needed
for (at least) one optimal production plan; and group T2, consisting of players
whose resources are never completely used in any of the optimal production
plans. Theorem 1 ensures that players in T1 can always find an allocation in
EOwen that gives them a strictly positive payoff. Examples have shown that
players in T2 may receive only zero payoffs from Owen allocations. Players
in both T1 and T2 are of special interest, since they receive strictly positive
payoffs from EOwen allocations, and may only receive zero payoffs from
Owen allocations (see for instance examples 1 and 2).
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Further research on this topic will focus on methods to find allocations
with particular extra properties in the EOwen set, as well as efficient algo-
rithms for obtaining them.
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